Posts Tagged ‘leon aron’
Three cheers for the Magnitsky Act and American values
In the next few days, the House and the Senate will almost certainly vote on and pass the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act. The bill is named after a 37-year old lawyer who was tortured to death in a Moscow prison after he uncovered an elaborate scheme that had defrauded the Russian treasury of $230 million. November 16th will be the third anniversary of his death.
The Magnitsky Act would deny entry to the United States and freeze the assets and property of those individuals responsible for this embezzlement, the death of Sergei Magnitsky and its cover up, as well as any current or future abuse of human and political rights.
The anti-Putin opposition in Russia has overwhelmingly supported the Magnitsky Act. Even leftists and nationalists have been ardently in favor. Just as vehemently, the Kremlin has denounced the legislation, crying “interference in its internal affairs” and threatening an “appropriate response.”
The “interference” objection has not a leg to stand on. The legislation is directed not against Russia but against those who torment and defraud it. Moreover, Russia and the Soviet Union—to which Russia is the legal successor—are party to multiple agreements, most notably the Helsinki Act of 1976 and its subsequent iterations that explicitly make human and political rights subject to international scrutiny.
As for the Kremlin’s response, Russians on the internet have had tons of fun with it: “No more shopping trips to Moscow by the wives of US officials!” “No more Black Sea vacations for them!” “US officials will be prohibited from keeping their money in Russian banks and their children denied admissions to Russian colleges!”
Although it might precipitate a petty tit-for-tat, the Magnitsky Act is part of something far larger than mere ups and downs in U.S.-Russian relations. It is a long overdue step reaffirming the core values that guide U.S. foreign policy and advancing what is—or ought to be—one of its key, overarching geostrategic objectives: The emergence of a stable, free, and democratic Russian state at peace, in the long last, with its own people and the world. быстрые займы на карту hairy girl https://zp-pdl.com/online-payday-loans-cash-advances.php https://zp-pdl.com/get-a-next-business-day-payday-loan.php займ на карту без отказов круглосуточно
Facebook
Twitter
Google Buzz
LinkedIn
del.icio.us
Google Bookmarks
Yahoo! Buzz
Tumblr
StumbleUpon
FriendFeed
NewsVine
Digg
A Russian ‘frenemy’
The White House is trying to revive the “reset” with Vladimir Putin’s Russia. It is likely to be a wasted effort. The reset is dead not because of someone’s ill will or mistakes. It is because Washington and Moscow have reached the limit of accommodation that neither could overstep without compromising the central elements and moral content of their foreign and domestic policies. The Obama administration’s effort would be far better spent on devising a more realistic strategy that at least stabilizes the relationship, albeit on a lower level of interaction.
Two sets of factors are mostly responsible for the growing disjunction between the United States and Russia: the diminution of Russia’s geo-strategic relevance for some key U.S. objectives, and the increasing prominence and role that Kremlin domestic behavior plays in U.S.-Russian relations.
In Afghanistan, the rapid drawdown of U.S. troops obviates much of the need for personnel and materiel transportation through Russia after 2014. With regard to Iran, another key U.S. concern, Russia has unambiguously signaled the end of its support for even watered-down resolutions that it previously voted for at the U.N. Security Council.
Syria has been an even starker demonstration of the diversion in guiding values and objectives. Russia thrice vetoed U.S.-supported Security Council resolutions calling for sanctions against the murderous Assad regime. The last of the vetoes was cast in July, despite President Obama’s appeal to President Putin in an hourlong telephone conversation. Throughout the conflict, Russia has continued to sell weapons and technology to Assad.
On Russia’s domestic front, following Putin’s reelection in March 2012, the Kremlin has undertaken a concerted and consistent effort to repress, intimidate, marginalize and stigmatize not just the political opposition but also citizens participating in peaceful protests and members of nonpolitical, independent civil movements and groups. Since the run-up to the Duma election in the second half of 2011, from Putin on down, the regime has been using alleged subversion by external enemies to justify the crackdown.
Read More →
- Facebook
- Twitter
- Google Buzz
- LinkedIn
- del.icio.us
- Google Bookmarks
- Yahoo! Buzz
- Tumblr
- StumbleUpon
- FriendFeed
- NewsVine
- Digg
