Posts Tagged ‘american interest’

23
September 2013

The Power of the Magnitsky Act

The American Interest

In early September, American Interest publisher Charles Davidson spoke with Hermitage Capital co-founder and CEO William Browder about the origins, impact and future of the Magnitsky Act.

Charles Davidson: Welcome, Bill; we appreciate you talking with us. Our timing is good, given the news out of New York two days ago.

William Browder: Yes, the timing couldn’t be better.

CD: Why don’t we start by having you introduce yourself to our readers?

WB: I come from a strange American family. My grandfather was the general secretary of the American Communist Party. As often happens in American families, in my teenage years I went through a rebellion. I figured the best way to rebel against a family of communists was to become a capitalist and ended up going to Stanford business school. I graduated in 1989, the year the Berlin Wall came down. After graduation, as I was trying to figure out what to do with my life, I had an epiphany. I figured that if my grandfather was the biggest communist in America, it would be perfectly symmetrical that I become the biggest capitalist in Eastern Europe.

CD: That seems logical.

WB: So I moved to London in 1989 and tried to get involved in Eastern Europe. I ended up at Salomon Brothers at the beginning of the Russian privatization program. When Yeltsin became President, he thought the best way to go from communism to capitalism in the country was by giving away state property for free to all Russians; then they’d all be capitalists by virtue of owning property. The program was very ill thought-out and badly designed, so instead of creating 150 million capitalists, it created 22 oligarchs and left most Russians living in destitute poverty.

Having said that, there were opportunities for non-oligarchs to buy shares of these newly privatized Russian companies. When the program first started, the shares were trading at a 99.7 percent discount to the value of similar companies in the West. And as a newly minted Stanford MBA, I did the math and thought if you’re going to be an investor, why not invest in companies trading at a 99.7 percent discount to their Western comparables? So I initially convinced Salomon Brothers to invest some of the firm’s own money in Russia. We invested $25 million and very quickly turned it into $125 million.

On the back of that success for Salomon Brothers I decided to set up my own company. I founded Hermitage Capital in 1996 and moved to Moscow full time to invest in the Russian stock market. My investments initially did very well. In the first 18 months, my portfolio went up more than 800 percent, and then in 1998 it went down 90 percent, basically back to square one.

After that, I discovered that the oligarchs had no incentive to behave themselves after Russia defaulted and devalued, because Wall Street was effectively closed for business for them. At the same time, there was no disincentive to misbehaving because the laws that exist in other countries didn’t exist in Russia. So the oligarchs embarked on an orgy of stealing that was unprecedented in the history of business.

I had to choose whether to allow everything to get stolen or to try to stop the stealing in the hope of recovering some of the lost money. Even though I was in completely uncharted territory and very dangerous, I decided to fight the stealing and become the first shareholder activist in Russia. I did so by researching how the thefts were occurring in big companies like Gazprom, Unified Energy Systems, and Surgutneftegaz, and then I shared my research with the international media.

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18
June 2013

Once More on Russia

The American Interest

I’m sure some readers are growing weary of the back-and-forth on Russia over the past few months, but I hope they will indulge me in one more response to Thomas Graham’s reply to me and other critics of his original piece. Replies from several of us generated his latest, “A Response to the Critics.” Several of his most recent points warrant further consideration.

In responding to Andrew Wood’s posting of March 29, Graham writes: “The United States should not shy away from defending and promoting its values (although Wood and I might differ on the best way to do that).” Graham never explains how he would do this in the case of Russia beyond exchange programs and the like, and later in his piece, he drops his passing support for promoting our values. Instead, he reverts back to his emphasis on engaging the Putin regime in other ways. Indeed, he alleges that “[I]f our goal is to advance the cause of democracy in Russia, then we must take care that our actions do not in fact limit the space for its progress.” According to Graham, the United States bears some responsibility for Russia’s current plight through things like “triumphalism in Washington over the ‘color revolutions’” and the Magnitsky Act, both of which, Graham claims, fed into the Kremlin’s paranoia and “inclined the Kremlin to deal more harshly with the systemic opposition.” To be clear, the Magnitsky Act was passed by Congress in December 2012; Putin had already pursued many ways to crack down on civil society and the opposition in Russia before the Magnistky Act became law.

Graham goes on to argue the following:

The United States would like to see a change in essence. To that end, it should amplify the pressure for such change by, for example, drawing Russia deeper into the globalized economy, ensuring as free an international flow of information as possible, and pressing the frontiers of technological advance. We also urgently need to fix our own society to provide a model of success for emulation. But we should leave to Russians the management of the internal politics of this change. It is, after all, their country. And why shouldn’t those who believe in democracy have some confidence that in the end the Russians will make the right choices, without mentoring and interference from the West?

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19
December 2012

What the Magnitsky Act Means

The American Interest

Sergei Magnitsky was a 37-year-old lawyer who was beaten, deprived of vital medical attention, and left to die in a Russian prison nearly a year after uncovering a massive fraud allegedly committed by Russian officials to the tune of $230 million. The very people whom Magnitsky implicated in the fraud arrested him in 2008; a year after his murder, several of these officials were promoted and awarded, adding insult to the fatal injury inflicted on Magnitsky.

Magnitsky’s client, Hermitage Capital head Bill Browder, launched a full-court press to seek justice for his lawyer in the West in the absence of any possibility for justice inside Russia. Browder recounted Magnitsky’s riveting story to members of the U.S. Congress and anyone else who would listen. Fortunately, two Congressmen, Senator Ben Cardin (D–MD) and Representative Jim McGovern (D–MA), did listen, and they followed up by leading the campaign to adopt the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act, which was approved by the House in a 365–43 vote November 16, and by the Senate with an equally bipartisan landslide (92-4) on December 6. The Act will deny visas to and freeze the assets of those in the Russian ruling elite implicated in Magnitsky’s murder and other human rights violations and corruption. Various polls in Russia show support for the legislation by a ratio of more than two-to-one among those familiar with it. In targeting sanctions against corrupt and abusive Russian officials as opposed to the whole country, the Act resonates with the many Russians who are fed up with these kinds of problems in their country. The next critical step is to get European countries to adopt similar measures, which would have an even greater impact on those Russians who like to travel and do business in Europe.

There will likely be international ramifications to the approval of the Magnitsky Act —especially if it gets applied to other abusive officials elsewhere around the world; Senator Cardin strongly supports such an extension of the law’s reach. The Act is also bound to influence the Russian-American relationship—if not today, then in the future. If not implemented aggressively, the legislation risks ending up as yet another piece in the “Let’s Pretend” game that the West has long been playing with Russia and other authoritarian states. (Indeed some hope for this outcome.) This would expose the deep crisis affecting the Western world and signal a victory for the forces of authoritarian corruption seeking to demoralize Western society. The U.S. Congress must see to it that the Obama Administration implements the legislation in a serious manner.

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12
November 2012

How Will Russia React to Obama, Round Two?

The American Interest

The question posed by my title doesn’t quite hit the mark. Just as one cannot really speak of a single “America”, there is no one “Russia” anymore but rather several Russias. But while each different Russia has its own interests, attitudes and moods, there is something that unites them all with respect to America: The United States is on all of their radars. All of the various Russias hope to use the United States and its policy to serve their own domestic agendas. (In contrast to this, Russia largely fell off America’s radar after the fall of the Soviet Union.)

How, then, will the various Russia’s react to the renewed Obama presidency? Let’s start with the official Russia—that is, Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin. Along with David Kramer, I have already discussed what the Russian establishment and Putin’s regime could have expected from either possible election result on November 6. I will only add here a couple of brushstrokes to that landscape now that we know the results of the election. Moscow’s official rhetoric and actions over the past year—that is, after Putin officially returned to the Kremlin—allow us to conclude that the Kremlin’s position on the United States would have been based on the following premises no matter who America hired as boss in the White House:

• America is weak. It is teetering on a “fragile foundation” and will continue to decline. The United States today can no longer continue as a world leader, and its ongoing fall from grace will give Russia more room to maneuver on the global scene.

• America needs Russia more than Russia needs America. The United States needs Russian help on Iran, Afghanistan, Syria, Central Asia, nuclear issues and counterbalancing China. All of these issues put the Kremlin in a stronger bargaining position with respect to Washington.

• America’s decline and European stagnation demonstrate that liberal democracy is in crisis. This fact justifies the Kremlin’s decision to return to the idea that Russia represents a “unique civilizational model.”

• America is bogged down by domestic problems. It is turning its focus inward, thus making it less prepared to react to the Kremlin’s turn toward repression. Moscow can dismiss Washington’s criticism; its bark is worse than its bite.

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