The Sergei Magnitsky bill

Financial Times

When Congress takes the lead on foreign policy the result is not usually optimal. Some worry that America’s first branch of government is about to add to its dubious record with passage of the Magnitsky bill – named after the Russian lawyer who died in a Moscow jail in 2009 after having exposed massive corruption.

There are reasons to worry Congress may be overreaching. But the bill should not be discarded. Russia may be an indispensable, if frequently obstructive, international partner. But at home its government sometimes behaves like a criminal enterprise. The treatment of Sergei Magnitsky is one such instance.

There are two main objections to the bill in its latest form. Neither is insuperable. The first concerns the need to accommodate Russia’s recent entry into the World Trade Organisation, which is a White House priority in what remains of this Congress. In order to comply with WTO rules, the US has to scrap the 1974 Jackson-Vanik law, which linked the Soviet Union’s trade access to human rights benchmarks, notably its treatment of Jewish “refuseniks”. The law lost its purpose after the USSR’s collapse in 1991.

US lawmakers are reluctant to be seen voting in favour of a trade bill so close to an election. Thus, over the state department’s objections, a bipartisan group has hitched its legislative wagon to the Magnitsky bill, which no lawmaker would be embarrassed to support. Nor should they be. But it is important that Congress endorse each measure separately. Russia’s WTO entry is in the US’s interest – and the largest US business groups are lobbying for approval. The bill should not be formally linked to an unrelated human rights measure. In practice this should be solvable.

The second objection is more serious and complex – that the US legislature would be damaging the executive’s ability to conduct diplomacy. Under the latest version of the bill, the state department would be required to publish an annual list of international human rights offenders who would be debarred from entering the US and have their financial assets frozen. In its initial language the bill was aimed at the 60 or so officials in Moscow whom Magnitsky is alleged to have found purloining $230m from the Russian state. It has since been broadened to cover other countries.

US diplomats say they already have the discretion to deny visas to undesirable foreign officials. They also worry that the bill would deter countries like Russia – and China – from co-operating on issues of critical concern, such as Syria and Iran. And they understandably distrust any hint of micromanagement by Capitol Hill. None should be fatal to the bill. In the first instance, there is merit in requiring the State Department to publish a list of banned officials. Some crimes are so odious that the culprits should be named and shamed. It also makes sense to freeze their overseas assets. The US cannot stop Russian government employees from torturing a whistleblower. But it can impose consequences.

Nor is there strong reason to believe the Magnitsky bill would alter Russia’s behaviour for the worse. Passage of Jackson-Vanik was followed by one of the longest periods of detente in the cold war. Both Russia and China are relatively cold-eyed in determining what is in their national interest. If drafted sensibly, the Magnitsky bill might even be helpful. Finally, lawmakers should give full latitude to US diplomats in deciding who should appear on the list. There has been talk of adding a broader range of names, including Russian parliamentarians. Congress should resist that impulse and grasp its own limits. If properly handled, and better drafted, the Magnitsky bill could become a useful tool in the US diplomatic arsenal. займ срочно без отказов и проверок займ онлайн на карту без отказа https://zp-pdl.com/get-a-next-business-day-payday-loan.php https://zp-pdl.com/get-quick-online-payday-loan-now.php buy over the counter medicines